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VALUE ITERATION ALGORITHM FOR MEAN-FIELD GAMES ∗
BERKAY ANAHTARCI , CAN DEHA KARIKSIZ , AND NACI SALDI †
Abstract. In the literature, existence of mean-field equilibria has been established for discrete-
time mean field games under both the discounted cost and the average cost optimality criteria.
However, there is no algorithm with convergence guarantee for computing mean-field equilibria for a
general class of models. In this paper, we provide a value iteration algorithm to compute mean-field
equilibrium for both the discounted cost and the average cost criteria. We establish that the value
iteration algorithm converges to the fixed point of a mean-field equilibrium operator. Then, using
this fixed point, we construct a mean-field equilibrium. In our value iteration algorithm, we use
Q-functions instead of value functions for possible extension of this work to the model-free setting.
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1. Introduction. In this paper, we propose a value iteration algorithm to com-
pute an equilibrium solution for discrete-time mean-field games under both the dis-
counted cost and the average cost optimality criteria. In the literature, the existence
of mean-field equilibria has been established for a very general class of mean-field
game models under both the discounted cost [22] and the average cost [26] optimality
criteria. However, there is no algorithm present in the literature for computing these
mean-field equilibria in a general class of models. Using Q-functions, we develop a
value iteration algorithm via the so-called mean-field equilibrium (MFE) operator.
This operator is very similar to the Bellman optimality operator in classical stochas-
tic control problems. The (only) difference is that the MFE operator also updates
the distribution of the state, in addition to the Q-function, in each iteration. We first
establish that the MFE operator is a contraction under some regularity assumptions
on the system components. Therefore, by Banach Fixed Point Theorem, there exists
a fixed point of this operator. Then, we construct a mean-field equilibrium using the
fixed point of MFE operator. Here, we use Q-functions instead of value functions,
which are generally used in classical value iteration algorithms, because of the possible
extension of the current work to model-free setting.
Mean-field games are the infinite population limits of finite-agent stochastic games
with mean-field interactions. Establishing the existence of the Nash equilibrium for a
finite-agent game problem is in general infeasible due to the decentralized nature of
the information structure and the large number of coupled agents. To overcome these
difficulties, one possible way is to consider the infinite-population limit of the problem
and use the fact that the equilibrium solution of the infinite-population limit is approx-
imately Nash in a finite-agent setting when the number of agents are sufficiently large.
Note that, in the limiting case, a generic agent is faced with a single-agent stochastic
control problem with a constraint on the distribution of the state at each time (i.e., a
mean-field game problem). The equilibrium solution in the infinite-population limit
is a pair which contains a policy and a state measure. This pair should satisfy Nash
certainty equivalence (NCE) principle [16] which states that, under a given state mea-
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sure, the policy should be optimal and when the generic agent applies this policy, the
resulting distribution of the agent’s state is same as the state measure. The purpose of
this paper is to develop a value iteration algorithm for computing such an equilibrium
under the discounted cost and the average cost criteria.
Mean-field games have been introduced by Huang, Malhame´, and Caines [16] and
Lasry and Lions [17] to establish the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for
continuous-time differential games with a large number of agents interacting through
a mean-field term. In continuous-time differential games, mean-field equilibrium can
be obtained by solving a Fokker-Planck equation evolving forward in time and a
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation evolving backward in time. We refer the reader
to [15, 24, 14, 2, 5, 6, 9, 20] for studies of continuous-time mean-field games with
different models and cost functions, such as games with major-minor players, risk-
sensitive games, games with Markov jump parameters, and LQG games.
Although there is an extensive literature on continuous-time mean-field games,
this is not so in the discrete-time setting. Existing studies mostly consider games
with finite or countable state spaces where the mean-field term only affects the cost
functions; that is, the evolution of the states of the agents is independent. The
studies that consider more general set-ups have only established the existence of mean-
field equilibrium and no algorithm with convergence guarantee has been proposed to
compute this mean-field equilibrium. Our work appears to be the first one that studies
this problem for a very general class of models. Reference [8] considers a discrete-time
mean-field game with a finite state space over a finite horizon. In [1], discrete-time
mean-field game with countable state-space is studied subject to an infinite-horizon
discounted cost criterion. References [7, 18, 21, 19] consider discrete-time mean-field
games with linear state dynamics. Reference [22] considers a discrete-time mean-field
game with Polish state and action spaces under the discounted cost optimality criteria.
There are only three papers [3, 26, 27] studying discrete-time mean-field games subject
to the average cost optimality criteria. In [27], the authors consider a discrete set-up
for average-cost mean-field games. In [3], the author considers average-cost mean-
field games with Polish state spaces. In that paper, it was assumed that, for the finite
agent game problem, the dynamics of the agents do not depend on the mean-field
term. Under strong conditions on system components, [3] establishes the existence
of Nash equilibria for finite-agent games, and then, shows that these Nash equilibria
converge to the mean-field equilibria in the infinite-population limit. Reference [26]
considers average-cost mean-field games with compact state spaces.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the infinite pop-
ulation mean-field game and define the mean-field equilibrium. In Section 2.1, we
formulate the finite-agent version of the game problem. In Section 3, we propose the
value iteration algorithm for both the discounted cost and the average cost optimality
criteria. In Section 3.1 we prove the convergence of the value iteration algorithm
for discounted cost. In Section 3.2 we prove the convergence of the value iteration
algorithm for average cost. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Notation. For a metric space E, we let P(E) denote the set of all Borel probability
measures on E. A sequence {µn} of measures on E is said to converge weakly to a
measure µ if
∫
E
g(e)µn(de) →
∫
E
g(e)µ(de) for all g : E → R that are bounded and
continuous. The set of probability measures P(E) is endowed with the Borel σ-algebra
induced by weak convergence. The notation v ∼ ν means that the random element
v has distribution ν. Unless specified otherwise, the term “measurable” will refer to
Borel measurability.
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2. Mean-field games and mean-field equilibria. A discrete-time mean-field
game is specified by
(
X,A, p, c, µ0
)
,
where X and A are the state and the action spaces, respectively. Here, X is a Polish
space (complete separable metric space) with the metric dX and A is a compact subset
of a finite dimensional Euclidean space Rd with the Euclidean distance norm ‖ · ‖.
The measurable function p : X×A×P(X)→ P(X) denotes the transition probability
of the next state given the previous state-action pair and the state-measure. The
measurable function c : X × A × P(X) → [0,∞) is the one-stage cost function. The
measure µ0 is the initial state distribution.
In this model, a policy pi is a stochastic kernel on A given X; that is, pi : X→ P(A)
is a measurable function. Let Π denote the set of all policies. By the Ionescu Tulcea
Theorem [11], a policy pi and an initial measure µ0 define a unique probability measure
P pi on (X× A)∞. The expectation with respect to P pi is denoted by Epi.
It is important to note that a mean-field game is neither a game nor a stochastic
control problem in the strict sense. We have a single agent that tries to minimize
an objective function as in stochastic control problems, but this agent should also
compete with the constraint on the state distribution at each time step as in game
problems. More precisely, we have a single agent and we model the collective behavior
of (a large population of) other agents by an exogenous state-measure µ ∈ P(X). This
measure µ should also be aligned with the state distribution of this single agent when
the agent applies its optimal policy. The precise mathematical description of the
problem is given as follows.
Let us fix a state-measure µ ∈ P(X) that describes the collective behavior of the
other agents. A policy pi∗ ∈ Π is optimal for µ if
Wµ(pi
∗) = inf
pi∈Π
Wµ(pi),
where W ∈ {J, V } and
Jµ(pi) = E
pi
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtc(x(t), a(t), µ)
]
,
Vµ(pi) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
Epi
[T−1∑
t=0
c(x(t), a(t), µ)
]
,
are the discounted cost and the average cost of policy pi under the state-measure µ,
respectively. Here, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. In this model, the evolution of
the states and actions is given by
x(0) ∼ µ0, x(t) ∼ p( · |x(t− 1), a(t− 1), µ), t ≥ 1,
a(t) ∼ pi( · |x(t)), t ≥ 0.
Now, define the set-valued mapping Ψ : P(X)→ 2Π as
Ψ(µ) = {pi ∈ Π : pi is optimal for µ and µ0 = µ};
that is, given µ, the set Ψ(µ) is the set of optimal policies for µ when the initial
distribution is µ as well.
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Conversely, we define another set-valued mapping Λ : Π→ 2P(X) as follows: given
pi ∈ Π, the state-measure µpi is in Λ(pi) if it is a fixed point of the equation
µpi( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, µpi)pi(da|x)µpi(dx).
In other words, µpi is the invariant distribution of the Markov transition probability
P (·|x) =
∫
A
p( · |x, a, µpi)pi(da|x). Without any assumptions on the transition prob-
ability, it is possible to have Λ(pi) = ∅ for some pi. However, under Assumption 1
below, Λ(pi) has an unique element for all pi. Therefore, it is indeed a single-valued
mapping.
The notion of equilibrium for mean-field games is defined via these mappings Ψ,
Λ as follows.
Definition 2.1. A pair (pi∗, µ∗) ∈ Π× P(X) is a mean-field equilibrium if pi∗ ∈
Ψ(µ∗) and µ∗ ∈ Λ(pi∗). In other words, pi∗ is an optimal policy given the state-measure
µ∗ and µ∗ is the state distribution under the policy pi∗.
In the literature, the existence of mean-field equilibria has been established for
both the discounted cost [22] and the average cost [26]. However, no algorithm is
proposed to compute this mean-field equilibrium. In this paper, our goal is to develop
a value iteration algorithm for computing a mean-field equilibrium. To that end, we
will impose certain assumptions on the components of the mean-field game model.
Before doing this, we need to give some definitions.
For any measurable function u : X × A → R, let umin(x) := infa∈A u(x, a) and
umax(x) := supa∈A u(x, a). Let w : X × A → [1,∞) be a continuous weight function.
For any measurable v : X× A→ R, we define w-norm of v as
‖v‖w := sup
x,a
|v(x, a)|
w(x, a)
.
For any measurable u : X→ R, we define wmax-norm of u as
‖v‖wmax := sup
x
|u(x)|
wmax(x)
.
Let B(X,K) be the set of real-valued measurable functions with wmax-norm less than
K. Let C(X) be the set of real-valued continuous functions on X. For each g ∈ C(X),
let
‖g‖Lip := sup
(x,y)∈X×X
|g(x)− g(y)|
dX(x, y)
.
If ‖g‖Lip is finite, then g is called Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant ‖g‖Lip.
Lip(X) denotes the set of all Lipschitz continuous functions on X, i.e.,
Lip(X) := {g ∈ C(X) : ‖g‖Lip <∞}
and Lip(X,K) denotes the set of all g ∈ Lip(X) with ‖g‖Lip ≤ K. For any µ, ν ∈ P(X),
we denote by C(µ, ν) the set of couplings between µ and ν; that is, ξ ∈ P(X × X) is
an element of C(µ, ν) if ξ(·×X) = µ(·) and ξ(X× ·) = ν(·). The Wasserstein distance
of order 1 [25, Definition 6.1] between two probability measures µ and ν over X is
defined as
W1(µ, ν) = inf
{∫
X×X
dX(x, y) ξ(dx, dy) : ξ ∈ C(µ, ν)
}
.
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By using Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality, we can also write Wasserstein distance of
order 1 [25, p. 95] as follows:
W1(µ, ν) := sup
{∣∣∣∣
∫
X
gdµ−
∫
X
gdν
∣∣∣∣ : g ∈ Lip(X, 1)
}
.
For compact X, the Wasserstein distance of order 1 metrizes the weak topology on
the set of probability measures P(X) (see [25, Corollary 6.13, p. 97]). However, in
general, it is stronger than weak topology.
Finally, we define F : X× Lip(X)× P(X)× A→ R as
F : X× Lip(X)× P(X)× A ∋ (x, v, µ, a) 7→ c(x, a, µ) + ξ
∫
X
v(y) p(dy|x, a, µ) ∈ R,
where ξ = β if the objective function is the discounted cost and ξ = 1 if the objective
function is the average cost. We may now state our assumptions.
Assumption 1.
(a) The one-stage cost function c is continuous. Moreover, it satisfies the follow-
ing Lipschitz bounds:
‖c(·, ·, µ)− c(·, ·, µˆ)‖w ≤ L1W1(µ, µˆ), ∀µ, µˆ,
sup
(a,µ)∈A×P(X)
|c(x, a, µ) − c(xˆ, a, µ)| ≤ L2 dX(x, xˆ), ∀x, xˆ.
(b) The stochastic kernel p( · |x, a, µ) is weakly continuous in (x, a, µ). Moreover,
it satisfies the following Lipschitz bounds:
sup
x∈X
W1(p(·|x, a, µ)− p(·|x, aˆ, µˆ)) ≤ K1 (‖a− aˆ‖+W1(µ, µˆ)) , ∀µ, µˆ, ∀a, aˆ,
sup
(a,µ)∈A×P(X)
W1(p(·|x, a, µ)− p(·|xˆ, a, µ)) ≤ K2 dX(x, xˆ), ∀x, xˆ.
(c) A is convex.
(d) There exist nonnegative real numbers M and α such that for each (x, a, µ) ∈
X× A× P(X), we have
c(x, a, µ) ≤M w(x, a),∫
X
wmax(y) p(dy|x, a, µ) ≤ αw(x, a).(2.1)
(e) Let F be the set of non-negative functions in
Lip
(
X,
L2
1− ξ K2
)⋂
B
(
X,
M
1− ξ α
)
,
where ξ = β if the objective function is the discounted cost and ξ = 1 if the
objective function is the average cost. For any v ∈ F , µ ∈ P(X), and x ∈ X,
F (x, v, µ, ·) is ρ-strongly convex; that is, F (x, v, µ, ·) is differentiable with the
gradient ∇F (x, v, µ, ·) and it satisfies
F (x, v, µ, a) ≥ F (x, v, µ, aˆ) +∇F (x, v, µ, aˆ)T · (a− aˆ) +
ρ
2
‖a− aˆ‖2,
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for some ρ > 0 and for all a, aˆ ∈ A. Moreover, the gradient ∇F (x, v, µ, ·) :
X×F × P(X)× A→ Rd satisfies the following Lipschitz bound:
sup
(x,a)∈X×A
‖∇F (x, v, µ, a)−∇F (x, vˆ, µˆ, a)‖ ≤ KF (‖v − vˆ‖wmax +W1(µ, µˆ)) ,
for every v, vˆ, µ, and µˆ.
Note that condition (d) is a standard assumption in the study of stochastic control
problems with unbounded one-stage cost functions [12]. Conditions (a) and (b) are
required in order to control the effect of the state-measure µ on the value functions
through the one-stage cost function and the state transition probability. Condition (e)
is imposed to control the effect of the state-measure µ on the optimal policy. Indeed,
this condition is equivalent to the canonical assumption that guarantees Lipschitz
continuity, with respect to unknown parameters, of the optimal solutions of the convex
optimization problem [4, Theorem 4.51].
2.1. Finite Player Game. The model introduced in the previous section is
actually the infinite-population limit of the finite-population game model that we
describe below.
In this model, we have N -agents with state space X and action space A. For every
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, let xNi (t) ∈ X and a
N
i (t) ∈ A denote the
state and the action of Agent i at time t, and
e
(N)
t ( · ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxN
i
(t)( · ) ∈ P(X)
denote the empirical distribution of the state configuration at time t, where δx ∈ P(X)
is the Dirac measure at x. The initial states xNi (0) are independent and identically
distributed according to µ0, and, for each t ≥ 0, the next-states (x
N
1 (t+1), . . . , x
N
N (t+
1)) are generated according to the probability distribution
N∏
i=1
p
(
dxNi (t+ 1)
∣∣xNi (t), aNi (t), e(N)t ).
A policy pi for a generic agent is a stochastic kernel on A given X. The set of all
policies for Agent i is denoted by Πi.
Let Π(N) =
∏N
i=1 Πi. By pi
(N) := (pi1, . . . , piN ), pii ∈ Πi, we denote an N -tuple of
policies for all the agents in the game. Under such an N -tuple of policies, the actions
at each time t ≥ 0 are generated according to the probability distribution
N∏
i=1
piit
(
daNi (t)
∣∣xNi (t)).(2.2)
For Agent i, the discounted cost and the average cost under the initial distribution
µ0 and the N -tuple of policies pi
(N) ∈ Π(N) are respectively given by
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)) = Epi
(N)
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtc(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t )
]
,
V
(N)
i (pi
(N)) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
Epi
(N)
[T−1∑
t=0
c(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t )
]
.
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Using these definitions, the Nash equilibrium is defined for this game model as
follows.
Definition 2.2. A policy pi(N∗) = (pi1∗, . . . , piN∗) constitutes a Nash equilibrium
if
W
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) = inf
pii∈Πi
W
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , pi
i)
for each i = 1, . . . , N , where pi
(N∗)
−i := (pi
j∗)j 6=i and W ∈ {J, V }.
For this game model, it is in general prohibitive to even prove the existence of
Nash equilibria due to the (almost) decentralized nature of the information structure
of the problem and the large number of players. However, when the number of players
are sufficiently large, one way to overcome this challenge is to introduce the infinite-
population limit N → ∞ of the game (i.e., mean-field game). In this limiting case,
we can model the empirical distribution of the state configuration as an exogenous
state-measure, which should be consistent with the distribution of a generic agent
by the law of large numbers (i.e., mean-field equilibrium). Hence, in the limiting
case, a generic agent is exactly faced with a mean-field game that is introduced in
the preceding section. One can then prove that if each agent in the finite-agent N
game problem adopts the mean-field equilibrium policy, the resulting policy will be an
approximate Nash equilibrium for all sufficiently large N (see, [22, Theorem 4.1], [26,
Section 5]). Therefore, by studying the infinite-population limit, which is easier to
handle, one can obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for the original finite-agent
game problem for which establishing the existence of an exact Nash equilibrium is
very difficult.
3. Value Iteration Algorithm. Note that, given any state-measure µ ∈ P(X),
the optimal control problem for the mean-field game reduces to finding an optimal
policy for a Markov decision process (MDP). Since an optimal value and an optimal
policy can be computed via a value iteration algorithm in MDPs, it is possible to
develop a similar value iteration algorithm for computing the mean-field equilibrium.
In this section, we develop such algorithms for both the discounted cost and the aver-
age cost optimality criteria using Q-functions. Our preference for using Q-functions
instead of value functions is the possible extension of the current work to model-free
setting via a Q-learning algorithm.
3.1. Discounted Cost. In this section, we first state the value iteration algo-
rithm for computing mean-field equilibrium and then establish the convergence of this
algorithm. To that end, in addition to Assumption 1, we assume the following.
Assumption 2.
(a) We assume that
k := max
{
β α+
KF
ρ
K1, L1 + β
L2
1− β K2
K1 +
(
KF
ρ
+ 1
)
K1 +K2
}
< 1.
For any state-measure µ, we define the optimal value function of the optimal
stochastic control problem by
J∗µ(x) := inf
pi∈Π
Epi
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtc(x(t), a(t), µ)
∣∣∣∣ x(0) = x
]
.
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The following characterization of optimal policies is a known result in the theory of
Markov Decision Processes (see [11, Chapter 4] and [12, Chapter 8]). First of all,
the optimal value function J∗µ(x) is the unique fixed point of the Bellman optimality
operator Tµ, which is βα-contractive with respect to wmax-norm; that is,
J∗µ(x) = min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, µ) + β
∫
X
J∗µ(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)
]
=: TµJ
∗
µ(x).
Moreover, if the mapping f∗ : X → A attains the minimum in equation above; that
is,
min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, µ) + β
∫
X
J∗µ(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)
]
= c(x, f∗(x), µ) + β
∫
X
J∗µ(y) p(dy|x, f
∗(x), µ),(3.1)
then the policy pi∗(a|x) = δf∗(x)(a) is optimal. In the classical value iteration algo-
rithm, the idea is to compute J∗µ(x) by iteratively applying the Bellman optimality
operator Tµ. Then, an optimal policy can be obtained by using J
∗
µ(x) and the Bellman
optimality equation (3.1). We can also establish the same result by using Q-functions
instead of value functions. Indeed, let us define the optimal Q-function as
Q∗µ(x, a) = c(x, a, µ) + β
∫
X
J∗µ(y) p(dy|x, a, µ).
Since Qµ,min = J
∗
µ, we can re-write the equation above
Q∗µ(x, a) = c(x, a, µ) + β
∫
X
Q∗µ,min(y) p(dy|x, a, µ) =: HµQ
∗
µ(x, a),
where Hµ is the Bellman optimality operator for Q-functions. One can prove that
Hµ is a contraction with modulus βα and the unique fixed point of Hµ is Q
∗. Hence,
we can develop a value iteration algorithm to compute Q∗, and using Q∗ we can
obtain the optimal policy. The advantage of this algorithm is that one can adapt this
algorithm to the model-free setting via Q-learning. Therefore, in the remainder of
this paper, we will develop value iteration algorithms using Q-functions instead value
functions.
Let us first define the set on which the Q-functions live:
C :=
{
Q : X× A→ [0,∞); ‖Q‖w ≤
M
1− β α
and ‖Qmin‖Lip ≤
L2
1− β K2
}
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. For any (x,Q, µ) ∈ X×C×P(X), by Assump-
tion 1-(e), there exists a unique minimizer f(x,Q, µ) of
c(x, a, µ) + β
∫
X
Qmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ) =: F (x,Qmin, µ, a).
Moreover, this unique minimizer f(x,Q, µ) makes the gradient of F (x,Qmin, µ, a)
(with respect to a) zero; that is,
∇F (x,Qmin, µ, f(x,Q, µ)) = 0.
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Now, we define the mean-field equilibrium (MFE) operator as follows:
H : C × P(X) ∋ (Q,µ) 7→ (H1(Q,µ), H2(Q,µ)) ∈ C × P(X),
where
H1(Q,µ)(x, a) := c(x, a, µ) + β
∫
X
Qmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)
H2(Q,µ)(·) :=
∫
X×A
p(·|x, f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ), µ)µ(dx).
Here, f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ) ∈ A is the unique minimizer of
H1(Q,µ)(x, a) := c(x, a, µ) + β
∫
X
Qmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ).
We first prove that H is well defined.
Lemma 3.1. H maps C × P(X) into itself.
Proof. It is clear that H2(Q,µ) ∈ P(X). Hence, we need to prove that H1(Q,µ) ∈
C. Let (Q,µ) ∈ C × P(X). Then, we have
sup
x,a
|H1(Q,µ)(x, a)|
w(x, a)
= sup
x,a
∣∣c(x, a, µ) + β ∫
X
Qmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)
∣∣
w(x, a)
≤ sup
x,a
|c(x, a, µ)|
w(x, a)
+ β sup
x,a
∣∣∫
X
Qmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)
∣∣
w(x, a)
≤M + β ‖Qmin‖wmax sup
x,a
∣∣∫
X
wmax(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)
∣∣
w(x, a)
(1)
≤ M + β α ‖Q‖w
≤M + β α
M
1− β α
=
M
1− β α
,
where (1) follows from Assumption 1-(d) and ‖Qmin‖wmax ≤ ‖Q‖w. Moreover, for any
x, xˆ ∈ X, we have
|H1(Q,µ)min(x) −H1(Q,µ)min(xˆ)|
=
∣∣∣∣mina∈A
[
c(x, a, µ) + β
∫
X
Qmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)
]
−min
a∈A
[
c(xˆ, a, µ) + β
∫
X
Qmin(y) p(dy|xˆ, a, µ)
]∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
a∈A
|c(x, a, µ)− c(xˆ, a, µ)|
+ β sup
a∈A
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
Qmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)−
∫
X
Qmin(y) p(dy|xˆ, a, µ)
∣∣∣∣
(1)
≤ L2 dX(x, xˆ) + β K2 ‖Qmin‖Lip dX(x, xˆ)
≤
L2
1− β K2
dX(x, xˆ),
where (1) follows from Assumption 1-(a),(b). This implies that H1(Q,µ) ∈ C which
completes the proof.
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Hence, the MFE-operator H is well-defined. Our next goal is to prove that H is a
contraction operator. Using this result, we will introduce a value iteration algorithm
that will give a mean-field equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2. The mapping H : C × P(X) → C × P(X) is a contraction with
constant k, where k is the constant in Assumption 2.
Proof. Fix any (Q,µ) and (Qˆ, µˆ) in C × P(X). First, we analyse the distance
between H1(Q,µ) and H1(Qˆ, µˆ):
‖H1(Q,µ)−H1(Qˆ, µˆ)‖w
= sup
x,a
∣∣∣∣c(x, a, µ) + β ∫XQmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)− c(x, a, µˆ)− β ∫X Qˆmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣
w(x, a)
≤ sup
x,a
∣∣c(x, a, µ)− c(x, a, µˆ)∣∣
w(x, a)
+ β sup
x,a
∣∣∣∣ ∫XQmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)− ∫X Qˆmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣
w(x, a)
(1)
≤ L1W1(µ, µˆ)
+ β sup
x,a
∣∣∣∣ ∫XQmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)− ∫X Qˆmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)
∣∣∣∣
w(x, a)
+ β sup
x,a
∣∣∣∣ ∫X Qˆmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)− ∫X Qˆmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣
w(x, a)
(2)
≤ L1W1(µ, µˆ)
+ β ‖Qmin − Qˆmin‖wmax sup
x,a
∫
X
wmax(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)
w(x, a)
+ β ‖Qˆmin‖Lip sup
x,a
W1(p(·|x, a, µ), p(·|x, a, µˆ))
w(x, a)
(3)
≤ L1W1(µ, µˆ) + β α ‖Q− Qˆ‖w + β
L2
1− β K2
K1W1(µ, µˆ)
(3.2)
where (1) follows from Assumption 1-(a), (2) follows from the fact that Qˆmin ∈ Lip(X),
and (3) follows from Assumption 1-(b),(d).
Next, we consider the distance between H2(Q,µ) and H2(Qˆ, µˆ). To that end,
we will first make a perturbation analysis to obtain an upper bound on the difference
between the unique minimizer f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ) ofH1(Q,µ)(x, a) and the unique min-
imizer f(x,H1(Qˆ, µ), µˆ) of H1(Qˆ, µˆ)(x, a), with respect to a. Recall the function
F : X× C × P(X)× A ∋ (x, v, µ, a) 7→ c(x, a, µ) + β
∫
X
v(y) p(dy|x, a, µ) ∈ R.
Since it is ρ-strongly convex by Assumption 1-(e), it satisfies [10, Lemma 3.2]
[∇F (x, v, µ, a+ r) −∇F (x, v, µ, a)]T · r ≥ ρ ‖r‖2,(3.3)
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for any a, r ∈ A. Let us set
a = f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ)
and
r = f(x,H1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ)− f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ).
As a = f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ) is the unique minimizer of a strongly convex function
F (x,Qmin, µ, ·), we have
∇F (x,Qmin, µ, f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ)) = 0.
The same is true for a + r = f(x,H1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ) and F (x, Qˆmin, µˆ, ·). Therefore, by
Assumption 1-(e) and (3.3), we have
−∇F (x, Qˆmin, µˆ, a)
T · r = −∇F (x, Qˆmin, µˆ, a)
T · r +∇F (x, Qˆmin, µˆ, a+ r)
T · r
≥ ρ ‖r‖2.(3.4)
Similarly, by Assumption 1-(e), we also have
−∇F (x, Qˆmin, µˆ, a)
T · r = −∇F (x, Qˆmin, µˆ, a)
T · r +∇F (x,Qmin, µ, a)
T · r
≤ ‖r‖ ‖∇F (x,Qmin, µ, a)−∇F (x, Qˆmin, µˆ, a)‖
≤ KF ‖r‖
(
‖Qmin − Qˆmin‖wmax +W1(µ, µˆ)
)
≤ KF ‖r‖
(
‖Q− Qˆ‖w +W1(µ, µˆ)
)
.(3.5)
Combining (3.4) and (3.5) yields
‖r‖ = ‖f(x,H1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ)− f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ)‖ ≤
KF
ρ
(
‖Q− Qˆ‖w +W1(µ, µˆ)
)
(3.6)
Now, we can start analysing the distance between H2(Q,µ) and H2(Qˆ, µˆ). To do
that we use the dual formulation of the W1 distance. Indeed, we have
W1(H2(Q,µ), H2(Qˆ, µˆ))
= sup
‖g‖Lip≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ), µ)µ(dx)
−
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, f(x,H1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ), µˆ) µˆ(dx)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
‖g‖Lip≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ), µ)µ(dx)
−
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, f(x,H1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ), µˆ)µ(dx)
∣∣∣∣
+ sup
‖g‖Lip≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, f(x,H1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ), µˆ)µ(dx)
−
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, f(x,H1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ), µˆ) µˆ(dx)
∣∣∣∣
(1)
≤
∫
X×A
sup
‖g‖Lip≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ), µ)µ(dx)
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−
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, f(x,H1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ), µˆ)
∣∣∣∣µ(dx)
+K2W1(µ, µˆ)
≤
∫
X×A
W1
(
p(·|x, f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ), µ), p(·|x, f(x,H1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ), µˆ)
)
µ(dx)
+K2W1(µ, µˆ)
(2)
≤
KF
ρ
K1
(
‖Q− Qˆ‖w +W1(µ, µˆ)
)
+K1W1(µ, µˆ) +K2W1(µ, µˆ).(3.7)
To show that (1) follows from Assumption 1-(b), let us define the Markov transition
probability P : X→ P(X) as
P (·|x) := p(·|x, f(x,H1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ), µˆ).
Let ξ ∈ P(X×X) be the optimal coupling that achieves Wasserstein distanceW1(µ, µˆ).
Similarly, for any x, y ∈ X, let K(·|x, y) ∈ P(X × X) be the optimal coupling that
achieves Wasserstein distance W1 (P (·|x), P (·|y)). Existence of such couplings follow
from [25, Corollary 5.22]. Note that
sup
‖g‖Lip≤1
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, f(x,H1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ), µˆ)µ(dx)
−
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, f(x,H1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ), µˆ) µˆ(dx)
∣∣∣∣
=W1 (µP, µˆP ) ,
where µP (·) =
∫
X
P (·|x)µ(dx) and µˆP (·) =
∫
X
P (·|x) µˆ(dx). Let us define ν(·) =∫
X×X
K(·|x, y) ξ(dx, dy). Clearly, ν is a coupling of µP and µˆP . Therefore, we have
W1 (µP, µˆP ) ≤
∫
X×X
dX(x, y) ν(dx, dy)
=
∫
X×X
∫
X×X
dX(x, y)K(dx, dy|xˆ, yˆ) ξ(dxˆ, dyˆ)
=
∫
X×X
W1(P (·|xˆ), P (·|yˆ)) ξ(dxˆ, dyˆ)
≤ K2
∫
X×X
dX(xˆ, yˆ) ξ(dxˆ, dyˆ) (by Assumption 1-(b))
= K2W1(µ, µˆ).
Hence, (1) follows. Note that (2) follows from (3.6) and Assumption 1-(b).
Now, the theorem follows by combining (3.2) and (3.7).
Since we have proven that H is a contraction operator, by Banach Fixed Point
Theorem, we can conclude that the following value iteration algorithm converges to
the fixed point of H . Using the output of this algorithm, we can then easily construct
a mean-field equilibrium as stated in the theorem below.
Theorem 3.3. Let (Q∗, µ∗) be the output of the above value iteration algorithm.
Construct the policy pi∗(a|x) = δf∗(x)(a), where
f∗(x) = argmin
a′∈A
Q∗(x, a
′).
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Algorithm 3.1 Value Iteration Algorithm
Start with (Q0, µ0)
while (Qn, µn) 6= (Qn−1, µn−1) do
(Qn+1, µn+1) = H(Qn, µn)
end while
return Fixed-point (Q∗, µ∗) of H
Then, the pair (pi∗, µ∗) is a mean-field equilibrium.
Proof. Note that (Q∗, µ∗) is a fixed point of H ; that is,
Q∗(x, a) = c(x, a, µ∗) + β
∫
X
Q∗,min(y) p(dy|x, a, µ∗)(3.8)
µ∗(·) =
∫
X
p(·|x, a, µ∗)pi∗(a|x)µ∗(dx).(3.9)
Here, (3.8) implies that pi∗ ∈ Ψ(µ∗) and (3.9) implies that µ∗ ∈ Λ(pi∗). Hence, (pi∗, µ∗)
is a mean-field equilibrium.
3.2. Average Cost. In this section, we consider the average cost mean-field
game. In addition to Assumption 1 (except (2.1)), we assume the following conditions.
Note that in place of (2.1), we assume condition (b) below.
Assumption 3.
(a) There exists a sub-probability measure λ on X such that
p( · |x, a, µ) ≥ λ( · )
for all x ∈ X, a ∈ A, and µ ∈ P(X).
(b) There exists non-negative constants α ∈ (0, 1) and b such that
∫
X
wmax(y) p(dy|x, a, µ) ≤ αw(x, a) + b.
(c) The equality below holds:
k := max
{
α+
KF
ρ
K1, L1 +
L2
1−K2
K1 +
(
KF
ρ
+ 1
)
K1 +K2
}
< 1.
Remark 3.4. Note that without loss of generality we can take b =
∫
wdλ. Indeed,
if b ≤
∫
wdλ, we can replace b with
∫
wdλ without violating the inequality in As-
sumption 3-(b). Conversely, if
∫
wdλ < b, then by first increasing the value of α so
that λ(X) + α > 1, and then adding a constant l to w, where
l :=
b −
∫
wdλ
λ(X) + α− 1
,
we obtain b <
∫
wdλ. Then, as before, we can set b =
∫
wdλ and Assumption 3-(b)
now holds for the new w and α.
Note that condition (b) is so-called the ‘drift inequality’ and condition (a) is the so-
called ‘minorization’ condition, both of which were used in the literature for studying
the ergodicity of Markov chains (see [12, Theorem 7.3.11 and Proposition 10.2.5]).
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These assumptions are quite general for studying the average cost stochastic control
problems with unbounded one-stage costs. The minorization condition was also used
to study average cost mean-field games with a compact state space [26, Assumption
A.3]. Assumption 3-(a) is true when the transition probability satisfies conditions
R1(a) and R1(b) in [13] (see also [13, Remark 3.3] and references therein for further
conditions). For Assumption 3-(b), we refer the reader to the examples in [12, Section
7.4] to see under which conditions on the system components Assumption 3-(b) holds.
For any state-measure µ, let us define the optimal value function as
V ∗µ (x) := inf
pi∈Π
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
Epi
[T−1∑
t=0
c(x(t), a(t), µ)
∣∣∣∣ x(0) = x
]
.
We define the operator Rµ as
Rµ u(x) = min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
u(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)−
∫
X
u(y)λ(dy)
]
= min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
u(y) q(dy|x, a, µ)
]
,
where q( · |x, a, µ) := p( · |x, a, µ) − λ( · ) is a sub-stochastic kernel and u : X→ R is a
continuous function with finite wmax-norm. Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 3,
one can prove that Rµ is a contraction operator with modulus α ∈ (0, 1) [23, Theorem
3.21]. Therefore, for each µ, there exists a fixed point hµ of Rµ by Banach Fixed Point
Theorem. Note that if Rµ hµ = hµ, then we have
hµ(x) + ρµ = min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
hµ(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)
]
,
where ρµ =
∫
X
hµ(y) γ(dy). The last equation is called the average cost optimality
equation (ACOE) in the literature [11, Chapter 5]. Since
lim
n→∞
Epi[hµ(x(n))]
n
= 0
for all pi ∈ Π by Assumption 3-(b), we have [11, Theorem 5.2.4]
ρµ = V
∗
µ (x) for all x ∈ X.
Moreover, if the mapping f∗ : X→ A attains its minimum in ACOE; that is,
min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
hµ(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)
]
=
[
c(x, f∗(x), µ) +
∫
X
hµ(y) p(dy|x, f
∗(x), µ)
]
,(3.10)
then the policy pi∗(a|x) = δf∗(x)(a) is optimal.
We now introduce the value iteration algorithm. Similar to the discounted cost
case, let us define the set on which Q-functions live:
M :=
{
Q : X× A→ [0,∞); ‖Q‖w ≤
M
1− α
and ‖Qmin‖Lip ≤
L2
1−K2
}
.
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Note that, for any (x,Q, µ) ∈ X ×M × P(X), by Assumption 1-(e), there exists a
unique minimizer f(x,Q, µ) of
c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
Qmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ) =: F (x,Qmin, µ, a).
Moreover, this unique minimizer f(x,Q, µ) makes the gradient of F (x,Qmin, µ, a)
(with respect to a) zero; that is,
∇F (x,Qmin, µ, f(x,Q, µ)) = 0.
Now, we define the mean-field equilibrium (MFE) operator as follows:
L :M×P(X) ∋ (Q,µ) 7→ (L1(Q,µ), L2(Q,µ)) ∈M×P(X),
where
L1(Q,µ)(x, a) := c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
Qmin(y) q(dy|x, a, µ)
L2(Q,µ)(·) :=
∫
X×A
p(·|x, f(x, L1(Q,µ), µ), µ)µ(dx).
Here, f(x,H1(Q,µ), µ) ∈ A is the unique minimizer of
L1(Q,µ)(x, a) := c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
Qmin(y) q(dy|x, a, µ).
We first prove that L is well-defined.
Lemma 3.5. L maps M×P(X) into itself.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove L1(Q,µ) ∈M. Let (Q,µ) ∈ M×P(X). Then, we
have
sup
x,a
|L1(Q,µ)(x, a)|
w(x, a)
= sup
x,a
∣∣c(x, a, µ) + ∫
X
Qmin(y)Q(dy|x, a, µ)
∣∣
w(x, a)
≤ sup
x,a
|c(x, a, µ)|
w(x, a)
+ sup
x,a
∣∣∫
X
Qmin(y) q(dy|x, a, µ)
∣∣
w(x, a)
≤M + ‖Qmin‖wmax sup
x,a
∣∣∫
X
wmax(y) q(dy|x, a, µ)
∣∣
w(x, a)
(1)
≤ M + α ‖Q‖w
≤M + α
M
1− α
=
M
1− α
,
where (1) follows from Assumption 3-(b) and ‖Qmin‖wmax ≤ ‖Q‖w. Moreover, for any
x, xˆ ∈ X, we have
|L1(Q,µ)min(x) − L1(Q,µ)min(xˆ)|
=
∣∣∣∣mina∈A
[
c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
Qmin(y) q(dy|x, a, µ)
]
−min
a∈A
[
c(xˆ, a, µ) +
∫
X
Qmin(y) q(dy|xˆ, a, µ)
]∣∣∣∣
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≤ sup
a∈A
|c(x, a, µ)− c(xˆ, a, µ)|
+ sup
a∈A
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
Qmin(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)−
∫
X
Qmin(y) p(dy|xˆ, a, µ)
∣∣∣∣
(1)
≤ L2 dX(x, xˆ) +K2 ‖Qmin‖Lip dX(x, xˆ)
≤
L2
1−K2
dX(x, xˆ),
where (1) follows from Assumption 1-(a),(b). This implies that L1(Q,µ) ∈M.
This result implies that MFE-operator L is well-defined. Our next goal is to
prove that L is a contraction operator. After that, we will introduce a value iteration
algorithm which will give a mean-field equilibrium.
Theorem 3.6. The mapping L : M×P(X) →M× P(X) is a contraction with
constant κ, where κ is the constant in Assumption 3.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2. Indeed, fix any (Q,µ) and
(Qˆ, µˆ) in M×P(X). First, we analyse the distance between L1(Q,µ) and L1(Qˆ, µˆ):
‖L1(Q,µ)− L1(Qˆ, µˆ)‖w
= sup
x,a
∣∣∣∣c(x, a, µ) + ∫XQmin(y) q(dy|x, a, µ)− c(x, a, µˆ)− ∫X Qˆmin(y) q(dy|x, a, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣
w(x, a)
≤ sup
x,a
∣∣c(x, a, µ) − c(x, a, µˆ)∣∣
w(x, a)
+ sup
x,a
∣∣∣∣ ∫XQmin(y) q(dy|x, a, µ)− ∫X Qˆmin(y) q(dy|x, a, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣
w(x, a)
(1)
≤ L1W1(µ, µˆ)
+ sup
x,a
∣∣∣∣ ∫XQmin(y) q(dy|x, a, µ)− ∫X Qˆmin(y) q(dy|x, a, µ)
∣∣∣∣
w(x, a)
+ sup
x,a
∣∣∣∣ ∫X Qˆmin(y) q(dy|x, a, µ)− ∫X Qˆmin(y) q(dy|x, a, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣
w(x, a)
(2)
≤ L1W1(µ, µˆ)
+ ‖Qmin − Qˆmin‖wmax sup
x,a
∫
X
wmax(y) q(dy|x, a, µ)
w(x, a)
+ ‖Qˆmin‖Lip sup
x,a
W1(p(·|x, a, µ), p(·|x, a, µˆ))
w(x, a)
(3)
≤ L1W1(µ, µˆ) + α ‖Q− Qˆ‖w +
L2
1−K2
K1W1(µ, µˆ)
(3.11)
where (1) follows from Assumption 1-(a), (2) follows from the fact that Qˆmin ∈ Lip(X),
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and (3) follows from Assumption 1-(b) and Assumption 3-(b).
Next, we consider the distance between L2(Q,µ) and L2(Qˆ, µˆ). First of all, by
using a similar analysis as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can bound the distance
between the unique minimizer f(x, L1(Q,µ), µ) of L1(Q,µ)(x, a) and the unique min-
imizer f(x, L1(Qˆ, µ), µˆ) of L1(Qˆ, µˆ)(x, a) as follows:
‖f(x, L1(Qˆ, µˆ), µˆ)− f(x, L1(Q,µ), µ)‖ ≤
KF
ρ
(
‖Q− Qˆ‖w +W1(µ, µˆ)
)
(3.12)
Using this and the same analysis in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can now obtain the
following bound on the distance between L2(Q,µ) and L2(Qˆ, µˆ):
W1(L2(Q,µ), L2(Qˆ, µˆ)) ≤
KF
ρ
K1
(
‖Q− Qˆ‖w +W1(µ, µˆ)
)
+ (K1 +K2)W1(µ, µˆ).
(3.13)
Now, theorem follows by combining (3.11) and (3.13).
since we have shown that L is a contraction operator, by Banach Fixed Point
Theorem, we can conclude that the following value iteration algorithm converges to
the fixed point of L. Using the output of this algorithm, we can then easily construct
a mean-field equilibrium as stated in the theorem below.
Algorithm 3.2 Value Iteration Algorithm
Start with (Q0, µ0)
while (Qn, µn) 6= (Qn−1, µn−1) do
(Qn+1, µn+1) = L(Qn, µn)
end while
return Fixed-point (Q∗, µ∗) of L
Theorem 3.7. Let (Q∗, µ∗) be the output of the above value iteration algorithm.
Construct the policy pi∗(a|x) = δf∗(x)(a), where
f∗(x) = argmin
a′∈A
Q∗(x, a
′).
Then, the pair (pi∗, µ∗) is a mean-field equilibrium.
Proof. Note that (Q∗, µ∗) is a fixed point of L; that is,
Q∗(x, a) = c(x, a, µ∗) +
∫
X
Q∗,min(y) q(dy|x, a, µ∗)(3.14)
µ∗(·) =
∫
X
p(·|x, a, µ∗)pi∗(a|x)µ∗(dx).(3.15)
From (3.14), we obtain
Q∗,min(x) + ρ∗ = min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, µ∗) +
∫
X
Q∗,min(y) p(dy|x, a, µ∗)
]
,
where ρ∗ =
∫
X
Q∗,min(x)λ(dx). Hence, (f∗, Q∗,min, ρ∗) solves the ACOE equation.
This implies that pi∗ ∈ Ψ(µ∗); that is, pi∗ is an optimal policy for µ∗ (see the discussion
at the beginning of this section). Moreover, (3.15) implies that µ∗ ∈ Λ(pi∗). Hence,
(pi∗, µ∗) is a mean-field equilibrium.
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4. Conclusion. This paper has established a value iteration algorithm for dis-
crete time mean-field games subject to discounted and average cost criteria. Under
certain regularity conditions on systems components, we have proved that the mean-
field equilibrium (MFE) operator in the value iteration algorithm is a contraction.
We have then used the fixed point of the MFE operator to construct a mean-field
equilibrium.
A possible future direction of research is to study the model-free version of the
same problem. By using a Q-learning algorithm, it might be possible to establish
similar results for the model-free case.
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